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Abstract: Many countries aim to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) by offering ever more 
generous incentive packages and justifying their actions with the expected knowledge 
externalities to be generated by foreign affiliates. Despite being hugely important to public 
policy, there is little conclusive evidence to support this claim.  This study examines firm-level 
data from Lithuania in an effort to further our understanding of this issue. The empirical results 
are consistent with positive productivity spillovers from FDI taking place through contacts 
between foreign affiliates and their local suppliers in upstream sectors, but there is no indication 
of spillovers occurring within the same industry. The data indicate that local firms benefit from 
the operation of foreign affiliates both in their own region and in other parts of the country, albeit 
the evidence of the latter outcome is weaker.  A larger effect is associated with domestic-market- 
rather than export-oriented foreign companies. There is no difference, however, between the 
impact of fully-owned foreign firms and those with joint domestic and foreign ownership.   
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Introduction 
 
Following the advice of multilateral development agencies, policymakers in many 
developing and transition economies place attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) high on 
their agenda, expecting FDI inflows to bring new technologies, know-how and thus contribute to 
increasing productivity and competitiveness of domestic industries.  Many countries go beyond 
national treatment of multinationals by offering foreign companies, through subsidies and tax 
holidays, more favorable conditions than those granted to domestic firms.
1  As the economic 
rationale for this special treatment, policy makers cite positive externalities generated by FDI 
through productivity spillovers to domestic firms.   
The only trouble is that there is no proof that positive productivity externalities generated 
by foreign presence actually exist.  As Dani Rodrik (1999) remarked, “today’s policy literature is 
filled with extravagant claims about positive spillovers from FDI but the evidence is sobering.”  
Indeed the difficulties associated with disentangling different effects at play and data limitations 
have prevented researchers from providing conclusive evidence of positive externalities resulting 
from FDI.  While recent firm-level studies have overcome many of the difficulties faced by the 
earlier literature, the emerging message is not very optimistic. 
The existing literature on this subject is of three kinds.  First, there are case studies 
including descriptions pertaining to particular FDI projects or specific countries, which however 
rarely offer quantitative information and are not easily generalized (see for instance, Rhee and 
Belot, 1989; Moran 2001).  Then, there is a plethora of industry level studies, most of which 
show a positive correlation between foreign presence and sectoral productivity.
2  Their downside 
is the difficulty in establishing the direction of causality.  It is possible that this positive 
association is caused by the fact that multinationals tend to locate in high productivity industries 
rather than by genuine productivity spillovers.  It may also be a result of FDI inflows forcing less 
productive domestic firms to exit and/or multinationals increasing their share of host country 
                                                 
1 For instance, in the late 1980s, the state of Kentucky offered Toyota an incentive package worth (in present value) 
125-147 million dollars for a plant expected to employ 3,000 workers.  In 1991, Motorola was paid 50.75 million 
pounds to locate a mobile-phone factory employing 3,000 people in Scotland (Haskel et al., 2001, p. 1).  FDI 
incentives are also offered by developing and transition economies. As an illustration, foreign firms in Hungary 
received 92.6 percent of all tax concessions provided in the country in 2000 (Csaki, 2001, p. 16). 
2 See, for example, the pioneering work by Caves (1974) focusing on Australia, Blomström and Persson’s (1983) 
and Blomström and Wolff’s (1994) papers on Mexico and the summary of studies on Mexican data by Blomström 
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market, both of which would raise the average productivity in the industry.  Finally, there is 
research based on firm-level panel data, which examines whether the productivity of domestic 
firms is correlated with the extent of foreign presence in their sector or region.  However, most 
of these studies, such as for instance, careful analyses done by Haddad and Harrison (1993) on 
Morocco, Aitken and Harrison (1999) on Venezuela and Djankov and Hoekman (2000) on the 
Czech Republic cast doubt on the existence of spillovers from FDI in developing countries.  The 
researchers either fail to find a significant effect or produce the evidence of negative horizontal 
spillovers, i.e., the effect the presence of multinational corporations has on domestic firms in the 
same sector. The picture is more optimistic in the case of industrialized countries as a recent 
paper by Haskel, Pereira and Slaughter (2002) provides convincing evidence of positive FDI 
spillovers in the UK.
3   
It is possible, though, that researchers have been looking for FDI spillovers in the wrong 
place.  Since multinationals have an incentive to prevent information leakages that would 
enhance the performance of their local competitors, but at the same time may want to transfer 
knowledge to their local suppliers, spillovers from FDI are more likely to be vertical rather than 
horizontal in nature.  In other words, spillovers are most likely to take place through backward 
linkages, that is contacts between domestic suppliers of intermediate inputs and their 
multinational clients, and thus they would not have been captured by the earlier studies.
4   
As Blomström et al. (2000) point out, however, there are hardly any empirical studies 
analyzing explicitly the relationship between linkages and spillovers.  The notable exceptions are 
two recent papers by Blalock (2001) and Schoors and van der Tol (2001), which provide 
evidence of positive FDI spillovers through backward linkages.
5 Moreover, despite the keen 
interest of policy makers in the subject, little is known about the factors driving vertical 
spillovers.  This study takes the first step towards filling this gap in the literature. 
The purpose of this study is twofold. First, it examines whether the productivity of 
domestic firms is correlated with the presence of multinationals in downstream sectors (i.e., their 
potential customers).  Detecting such an effect would be consistent with the existence of broadly 
                                                 
3 For a survey of the literature on horizontal spillovers from FDI see Görg and Strobl (2001).   
4 For a theoretical justification of spillovers through backward linkages see Rodriguez-Clare (1996), Markusen and 
Venables (1999) and Saggi (2002). For case studies see Moran (2001).  
5 Kugler (2000) also finds inter-sectoral technology spillovers from FDI in Colombia.  However, he does not 
distinguish between different channels through which such spillovers may be occurring (e.g., backward versus 
forward linkages). William Davidson Institute Working Paper 548 
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defined spillovers through backward linkages. This paper improves over the existing literature by 
taking into account econometric problems that may have biased the results of earlier work. 
Namely, it employs the semiparametric estimation method suggested by Olley and Pakes (1996) 
to account for endogeneity of input demand.  Moreover, standard errors are corrected to take into 
account the fact that the measures of potential spillovers are industry specific while the 
observations in the data set are at the firm level.  As Moulton (1990) pointed out, failing to make 
such a correction will lead to serious downward bias in the estimated errors thus resulting in 
spurious finding of statistical significance for the aggregate variable of interest. 
Second, this study goes beyond the existing literature by shedding some light on 
determinants of spillovers.  It examines whether potential benefits stemming from vertical 
linkages are related to export-orientation of multinationals in downstream sectors and the extent 
of foreign ownership in affiliates.  Based on case studies and investor surveys, these factors have 
often been conjectured to influence the extent and benefits of backward linkages, but to the best 
of our knowledge, their impact has not been systematically examined.
6 
The analysis is based on data from the annual enterprise survey conducted by the 
Lithuanian Statistical Office. The survey coverage is extensive, as firms accounting for about 85 
percent of output in each sector are included. The data constitute an unbalanced panel covering 
the period 1996-2000.  Focusing on a transition economy, such as Lithuania, seems very suitable 
for this project as the endowment of skilled labor enjoyed by transition countries makes them a 
particularly likely place where productivity spillovers could manifest themselves.
7   
The results can be summarized as follows. The empirical results are consistent with the 
existence of positive spillovers from FDI taking place through backward linkages but no 
indication of spillovers occurring through horizontal channels. In other words, firm productivity 
is positively correlated with the extent of potential contacts with multinational customers but not 
with the presence of multinationals in the same industry. The data also indicate that local firms 
benefit from the operation of foreign affiliates both in their own region and in other parts of the 
country, albeit the evidence of the latter outcome is weaker.  The magnitude of the effect is 
economically meaningful. A one-standard-deviation increase in the foreign presence in the 
                                                 
6 See UNCTC (2001, chapter 4) for a comprehensive review of this topic. 
7 For instance, during 1990-2000 the number of scientists and engineers in R&D activities per million people was 
equal to 2,031 in Lithuania, as compared to 2,139 in Korea, 711 in Argentina, 168 in Brazil and 154 in Malaysia 
(Global Economic Indicators, 2002, World Bank). William Davidson Institute Working Paper 548 
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sourcing sectors (i.e., an increase in the backward variable of three percentage points) is 
associated with a ten percent rise in output of each firm in the supplying industry.  As for the 
determinants, the productivity effect is found to be larger when the multinationals in the sourcing 
sector are oriented towards supplying the domestic market rather than focusing mainly on 
exporting.  Finally, there is no statistically significant difference between the productivity effects 
associated with partially- and fully-owned foreign projects. 
In summary, this paper adds to the understanding of externalities generated by FDI in a 
host country economy, which is a highly important issue for public policy.  The finding of a 
positive correlation between firm productivity and multinational presence in downstream sectors 
is, however, by no means a call for subsidizing FDI.  These results are consistent with the 
existence of knowledge spillovers from foreign affiliates to their local suppliers but they may 
also be due to increased competition in upstream sectors. The latter may be the case if 
multinationals entering downstream sectors force less productive domestic producers to exit thus 
lowering the demand for domestically produced intermediates, either because they are more 
efficient and need fewer inputs
8 or they choose to import their inputs (due to their higher quality, 
constraints imposed by the parent company, etc.).  The welfare implications of the two scenarios 
are quite different.  While the former case would call for FDI incentives, it would not be the 
optimal policy in the latter.  More research is certainly needed to disentangle these effects. 
  
This study is structured as follows.  The next section briefly discusses vertical spillovers 
and their determinants.  It is followed by a description of FDI inflows into Lithuania.  Then the 
data and the estimation strategy are presented.  The following section presents the empirical 
results, and the closing section concludes.   
 
Vertical Spillovers and Their Determinants 
 
Productivity spillovers from FDI take place when the entry or presence of multinational 
corporations increases productivity of domestic firms in a host country and the multinationals do 
not fully internalize the value of these benefits.  Spillovers may take place when local firms 
                                                 
8 See Saggi’s (2002) model for such a scenario. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 548 
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improve their efficiency by copying technologies of foreign affiliates operating in the local 
market either based on observation or by hiring workers trained by the affiliates.  Another kind 
of spillovers occurs if multinational entry leads to more severe competition in the host country 
market and forces local firms to use their existing resources more efficiently or to search for new 
technologies (Blomström and Kokko, 1998).  While the knowledge spillovers present a rationale 
for governments to subsidize FDI inflows, this is not the case when the improved productivity of 
local firms is due to increased competition, as inducing greater competition may be achieved by 
other means (import liberalization, anti-trust policies, etc.). 
When local firms benefit from the presence of foreign companies in their sector, this 
phenomenon is referred to as horizontal spillovers.  To the extent that domestic firms compete 
with multinationals, the latter have an incentive to prevent technology leakage and spillovers 
from taking place.  This can be achieved through formal protection of their intellectual property, 
trade secrecy, paying higher wages or locating in countries or industries where domestic firms 
have limited imitative capacities to begin with. 
On the other hand, the term vertical spillovers (in this paper restricted to the backward 
linkage channel) refers to productivity spillovers taking place due to linkages between foreign 
firms and their local suppliers. Such spillovers can operate through: (i) direct knowledge transfer 
from foreign customers to local suppliers;
9 (ii) higher requirements regarding product quality and 
on-time delivery introduced by multinationals, which provide incentives to domestic suppliers to 
upgrade their production management or technology; (iii) indirect knowledge transfer through 
labor turnover; (iv) increased demand for intermediate products due to multinational entry, 
which allows local suppliers to reap the benefits of scale economies;
10 (v) competition 
effect−multinationals acquiring domestic firms may choose to source intermediates abroad thus 
breaking existing supplier-customer relationships and increasing competition in the intermediate 
products market.
11 
                                                 
9 As numerous case studies indicate (see Moran 2001), multinationals often provide technical assistance to their 
suppliers in order to raise the quality of their products or facilitate innovation.  They help suppliers with 
management training and organization of the production process, purchasing raw materials and even finding 
additional customers.  Note that the existence of linkages does not necessarily guarantee that spillovers take place 
nor does the fact that multinationals may charge for services provided preclude the presence of spillovers.  
Spillovers take place when foreign affiliates are unable to extract the full value of the resulting productivity increase 
through direct payment or lower prices they pay for intermediates sourced from the local firm. 
10 For a theoretical model, see Rivera-Batiz and Rivera-Batiz (1990). 
11 One of the largest FDI projects in Romania, Renault’s purchase of an equity stake in Dacia, the local automobile 
maker, may serve as an example.  The initial transaction took place in 1999 with subsequent increases in Renault’s William Davidson Institute Working Paper 548 
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Consider factors that could potentially drive vertical spillovers.  First, the motivation for 
undertaking FDI is likely to affect the extent of local sourcing by foreign affiliates.  It has been 
suggested that domestic-market-oriented foreign affiliates tend to purchase more locally that 
export-oriented ones (UNCTAD 2000; Altenburg 2000; Belderbos et al. 2001).  Quality and 
technical requirements associated with goods targeted for the domestic market may be lower and 
thus local suppliers may find it easier to serve multinationals focused on the domestic market. On 
the other hand, multinationals serving global markets may impose more stringent cost and 
quality requirements, which may be difficult for local suppliers to meet.  Moreover, affiliates 
which are part of international production systems are likely to be more dependent on global 
sourcing policies of their parent company and thus have less freedom to choose their own 
suppliers.  
Second, it has been argued that affiliates established through M&As or joint ventures are 
likely to source more locally than those taking form of greenfield projects (UNCTC 2001).   
While the latter have to take time and effort to develop local linkages, the former can take 
advantages of the supplier relationships established by the acquired firm or their local partner.  
Empirical evidence to support this view has been found for Japanese investors (Belderbos et al., 
2001) and for Swedish affiliates in Eastern and Central Europe (UNCTC 2000).
12  While in the 
dataset used here it is impossible to distinguish between acquisitions, joint ventures and 
greenfield projects, it contains information on the extent of foreign ownership.  To the extent that 
full foreign ownership is a proxy for greenfield projects, it is expected that fully-owned foreign 
affiliates will tend to rely more on imported inputs, while investment projects with local capital 
participation will tend to source more locally. Therefore, backward linkages associated with the 
latter group are likely to result in greater spillovers. 
In what follows, the above hypotheses are examined.  First, however, FDI-related 
developments in Lithuania are briefly reviewed. 
                                                                                                                                                             
share in 2001and 2002.  After the acquisition, the French company promised to continue sourcing inputs from local 
suppliers provided they lived up to the expectations of the new owner.  This, however, does not seem to have been 
the case.  In 2002, eleven foreign suppliers of the French group will start operating in Romania, thus replacing the 
Romanian producers from whom Dacia used to source. Source:  Ziarul Financiar (Financial Newspaper) April 19, 
2001. 
12 The results of a study of the largest exporters in Hungary (Toth and Semjen 1999) also indicate that foreign 
affiliates with larger shares of foreign equity tend to purchase fewer inputs from Hungarian companies. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 548 
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Foreign Direct Investment in Lithuania 
 
Similarly to other former Soviet Republics, Lithuania had been virtually closed to foreign 
investment before 1990.  After regaining its independence in 1990, Lithuania began the process 
of transition to a market economy and opened its borders to FDI.  Yet unlike transition 
economies of Central and Eastern Europe (CEECs hereafter), it did not receive large FDI inflows 
until the late 1990s.  The first stage of the privatization process, starting in 1991, offered limited 
opportunities for foreign investors.  It was not until 1997 that FDI inflows into Lithuania 
increased significantly as a result of the second stage of the privatization process (see the chart 
below).  As is evident from Table A below, the overall magnitude of FDI inflows has not been 
very large.  In terms of cumulative FDI inflows per capita during the period 1993-2000, 
Lithuania ranks eighth among CEECs above Bulgaria and Romania.  In terms of the value of 
cumulative FDI inflows, Lithuania ranks ninth exceeding only FDI receipts of Slovenia.   
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Table A.  FDI Inflows into CEECs 1993-2000.                 
                      
   Net FDI inflow (millions of US$)  FDI inflows 
2000 
FDI inflows 
1993-2000 
   1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
as % of 
GDP 
per 
capita 
Value 
(mn US$)
Per capita 
(US$) 
Czech  Republic  654  878 2,568 1,435 1,286 3,700 6,313 4,583 9.3  446  21,417  2,085
Hungary  2,350 1,144 4,519 2,274 2,167 2,037 1,977 1,692  3.7  169  18,159  1,812
Estonia  162 214 201 150 266 581 305 387  7.8  270  2,268  1,580
Poland  1,715 1,875 3,659 4,498 4,908 6,365 7,270 9,342  5.9  242  39,632  1,025
Latvia  45 214 180 382 521 357 348 407  5.7  169  2,454  1,015
Slovenia  113 128 177 194 375 248 181 181  1.0  91  1,597  803
Slovak  Republic  199 270 236 351 174 562 354  2,052  10.7  380  4,198  777
Lithuania  30  31  73 152 355 926 486 379  3.4  102  2,432  658
Bulgaria  40 105  90 109 505 537 806  1,002  8.3  123  3,194  391
Romania  94 341 419 263  1,215  2,031 1,041 1,025  2.8  46  6,429  287
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics (FDI figures) and World Bank World Development Indicators (GDP and population) 
 
In terms of sectoral distribution of FDI, 44 percent of the FDI stock in 1996 was in 
manufacturing.  Following large inflows into the telecommunications and financial sectors, this 
figure decreased to 32 percent in 2000.  When the number of projects is considered, in 1996 20 
percent of FDI was in manufacturing, as compared to 21 percent in 2000.  Within manufacturing, 
food products, beverages and tobacco attracted the largest share of investment (12 percent of 
total FDI stock), followed by textiles and leather products (4 percent) and refined petroleum and 
chemicals (4 percent).  Electrical machinery, optical instruments and wood products also 
received significant foreign investments.  As for service sectors, wholesale and retail trade 
accounted for a quarter of FDI stock in 2000, telecommunications for 18 percent and financial 
intermediation for 14 percent.  
 
Data and Methodology 
 
The data used in this study come from the annual enterprise survey conducted by the 
Lithuanian Statistical Office.  The survey coverage is extensive, as firms accounting for about 85 
percent of output in each sector are included in the sample.  The Lithuanian enterprise data have 
been praised for their high quality and reliability.
13  The data constitute an unbalanced panel 
covering the period 1996-2000.  The number of firms per year varies from over twelve thousand 
in 1996 to twenty one thousand in 1999.  Due to financial constraints in some years the 
                                                 
13 A recent survey examining the quality of data collected by statistical offices ranked Lithuania second among 
twenty transition economies (see Belkindas et al., 1999). William Davidson Institute Working Paper 548 
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Statistical Office was forced to reduce the scope of the exercise.  In each year, however, the same 
sampling technique was used.  In this study, the attention is restricted to manufacturing firms 
only (NACE sectors 15-36), which lowers the sample size to 2,500 to 4,000 firms a year.  The 
number of observations is further reduced by missing values. Moreover, two sectors tobacco 
(NACE 16) and manufacturing of refined petroleum products (NACE 23) are excluded, since the 
small number of firms makes it impossible to apply the Olley-Pakes technique (discussed below) 
to these industries.  Thus the final sample size varies between 1,921 and 2,712 firms in a given 
year. The sectoral distribution of firms in the last year of the sample is presented in Table 1. 
In addition to standard financial statements, the dataset contains information on the 
amount of foreign capital, if any, that has been invested in each firm, which allows for making 
comparisons between FDI recipients and locally owned firms.  FDI recipients are defined as 
firms with the foreign share equal to at least ten percent of total capital.   More than 12 percent of 
the total of 11,644 observations pertain to such firms.  The dataset also includes information on 
the share of exports in firm sales. 
 
To examine the correlation between firm productivity and foreign presence in the same 
industry or downstream sectors, the approach taken by the earlier literature is followed and 
several variations of the following equation are estimated: 
ln Yijrt = α  + β1 ln Kijrt + β2 ln Lijrt + β3 ln Mijrt + β4 FSijrt + β5 Horizontaljt + β6 Backwardjt + αt 
+αr+αj+ εijrt 
Yijrt stands for the real output of firm i operating in sector j and region r at time t, which is 
calculated by adjusting the reported sales for changes in inventories of finished goods and 
deflating the resulting value by the Producer Price Index for the appropriate two-digit NACE 
sector.  Kijrt, capital, is defined as the value of fixed assets at the beginning of the year, deflated 
by the average of the deflators for four NACE sectors: machinery and equipment; office, 
accounting and computing machinery; electrical machinery and apparatus; motor vehicles, trailer 
and semi-trailers; and other transport equipment.  Lijrt, employment, is measured by the number 
of workers.
14 Mijrt, material inputs, are equal to the value of material inputs adjusted for changes 
in material inventories, deflated by material inputs deflator calculated for each sector based on 
                                                 
14 Ideally we would like to have information on hours worked but, unfortunately, it is not available.  Neither can we 
distinguish between skilled and unskilled workers. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 548 
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the two-digit input-output matrix and deflators for the relevant two-digit NACE sectors. FSijrt 
measures the share of foreign capital in firm’s total capital.   
Horizontaljt captures the extent of foreign presence in sector j at time t and is defined as 
foreign equity participation averaged over all firms in the sector, weighted by each firm’s share 
in sectoral output.
15  In other words, 
Horizontaljt= [Σi for all i∈ j  FSijt * Yijt]/ Σ i for all i∈ j  Yijt 
Thus the value of the variable increases with the output of foreign investment enterprises and the 
share of foreign capital in these firms.   
The variable Backward is a proxy for the foreign presence in the industries that are being 
supplied by the sector to which the firm in question belongs and thus is intended to capture the 
extent of potential contacts between domestic suppliers and multinational customers.
16 It is 
defined in the following way: 
Backwardjt = Σk if k≠j  αjk Horizontalkt 
where αjk  is the proportion of sector j’s output supplied to sector k taken from the 1996 input-
output matrix at the two-digit NACE level.  The proportion is calculated excluding products 
supplied for final consumption but including imports of intermediate products.
17  As the formula 
indicates, inputs supplied within the sector are not included, since this effect is already captured 
by the Horizontal  variable.
18  Thus the greater the foreign presence in sectors supplied by 
industry j and the larger the share of intermediates supplied to industries with multinational 
presence, the higher the value of the variable. 
While the coefficients taken from the input-output table remain fixed, changes in foreign 
presence and firm output are observed during the period in question.  Thus the variables 
                                                 
15 This definition is analogous to that in Aitken et al. (1999) who use employment as weights.  Blalock (2001) and 
Schoors et al. (2001) employ output weights but do not take into account the share of foreign equity, treating total 
output of firms with at least ten percent foreign equity as foreign.   
16 To illustrate the meaning of the variable, suppose that the sugar industry sells half of its output to jam producers 
and half to chocolate producers.  If there are no multinationals producing jam but half of all chocolate production 
comes from foreign affiliates, the Backward variable will be calculated as follows ½*0 + ½*½ = 0.25. 
17 Since relationships between sectors may change over time (although a radical change is unlikely), ideally we 
would like to use multiple input-output matrices. Unfortunately, input-output matrices for later years are 
unavailable.  Similarly, while we would prefer to use a matrix excluding imports, it is not available.  Thus, our 
results should be interpreted keeping these two caveats in mind. 
18 This approach is followed by Schoors et al. (2001) but not by Blalock (2001).  Including the share of 
intermediates supplied within the sector in the Backward measure (as was done in an earlier version of this paper) 
does not change the conclusions with respect to the correlation between firm productivity and foreign presence in 
the sourcing sectors. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 548 
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capturing horizontal and vertical linkages are time-varying sector-specific variables.  Table 1 
lists the values of both variables in year 2000.  In addition to the calculation described above, the 
Horizontal variable is recalculated making it firm specific by excluding the output of the firm in 
question in the calculations.  Since both definitions lead to the same qualitative results, only the 
results with the latter measure are presented.
19  Finally, the basic specification of the model also 
includes year, region and industry dummies.  Summary statistics for the variables employed are 
presented in Table 2. 
 
Several econometric concerns need to be addressed.  The first concern is the omission of 
unobserved variables.  There may exist firm, time and region specific factors unknown to 
econometrician but known to the firm that may affect the correlation between firm productivity 
and foreign presence.  Examples of these variables include high quality management in a 
particular firm or better infrastructure present in a given region.  This problem is addressed by 
following Haskel et al. (2002) and using time differencing as well as a full set of fixed effects for 
year, industry and region.  As Haskel et al. point out, in addition to removing any fixed plant-
specific unobservable variation, differencing will also remove fixed regional and industrial 
effects such as infrastructure and technological opportunity.  Time, industry and regional dummy 
variables on the other hand will control for unobservables that may be driving changes in, for 
instance, attractiveness of a particular region or industry.
20  Thus the specification becomes 
∆ ln Yijrt = α  + δ1∆ ln Kijrt +∆ δ2 ∆ ln Lijrt + δ3 ∆ ln Mijrt + δ4 ∆ FSijrt + δ5 ∆ Horizontaljt  
+ δ6 ∆ Backwardjt + αt +αr+αj+ εijrt 
Second, as Djankov and Hoekman (2000) and Evenett and Voicu (2001) have shown, 
foreign investors tend to acquire stakes in the largest and most successful companies in transition 
economies. If this issue is not taken into account, the estimation results could be biased.  To 
avoid such a bias, the model is also estimated on a sample of domestic firms only.
21  
Additionally, the two-step procedure devised by Maddala (1983) has been used.  The procedure 
amounts to estimating first a probit model on whether or not firm i ever received FDI on firm 
size (measured by total capital) and profitability (measured by the ratio of gross profits to sales) 
                                                 
19 Note that recalculating the Horizontal variable will not affect the Backward measure since it does not take into 
account inputs suppliers to own sector. 
20 As Haskel et al. mention, in this case a fixed effect for region r captures not just the fact that region r is an 
attractive business location but that its attractiveness is rising over time. 
21 Domestic firms are defined as those with less than ten percent of foreign equity. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 548 
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in the first year of the sample, subsequently not used in the second stage.  The estimates from the 
first stage are then used to form an additional regressor in the second stage estimation of 
productivity on foreign presence, annual and regional dummies.  The results (not reported here) 
led to the same qualitative results. 
Third, it has been argued that the use of ordinary least squares may be inappropriate when 
estimating productivity since this method treats labor and other inputs as exogenous variables. 
Griliches and Mairesse (1995) have argued that inputs should be considered endogenous since 
they are chosen by firm based on its productivity, which is observed by the producer but not by 
the econometrician.  Not taking into account the endogeneity of input choices may bias the 
estimated coefficients. Since the focus of this paper is on firm productivity, the consistency of 
the estimates is crucial for the analysis. Therefore, the semiparametric estimation procedure 
suggested by Olley and Pakes (1996) is employed.
22  The details of the procedure are described 
in the Appendix.   
A production function, taking into account the Olley-Pakes correction, is separately 
estimated for each industry.  From this estimation, the measure of total factor productivity, which 
is the difference between the actual and predicted output, is recovered and used in the estimation 
of the basic model.  Note that the Olley-Pakes procedure rests on the assumption of factors fully 
adjusting to shocks in each period and markets being perfectly competitive.  Since there may be 
some doubt about the validity of these assumptions, particularly in the context of a transition 
economy, the results both with and without the correction are presented.
23  Further, while this 
method also allows for controlling for firm exit, this option is not utilized here since, 
unfortunately, the dataset does not allow for distinguishing between firm exit from the sample 
due to liquidation or due to not being included in the group of enterprises surveyed in a given 
year.   
The last but not the least econometric concern has been pointed out by Moulton (1990) 
who shows that in the case of regressions performed on micro units yet including aggregated 
market (or in this case industry) variables the standard errors from ordinary least squares will be 
underestimated.  As he demonstrates, failing to take this into account will lead to a serious 
                                                 
22 This method has been recently applied by, for instance, Pavcnik (2002). 
23 As stated in Olley-Pakek (1996), the correction should be applied only to firms with positive investment figures.  
Thus to make the results with and without correction directly comparable we employ the same sample of firms in 
both types of regressions.  Note that regressions not involving the Olley-Pakes correction estimated on the full 
sample of firms (i.e., including firms with zero investments) lead to the same qualitative results. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 548 
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downward bias in the estimated errors resulting in spurious finding of statistical significance for 
the aggregate variable of interest.  To address this issue, the standard errors are corrected for a 
correlation between observations belonging to the same industry in a given year (in other words, 
standard errors are clustered for all observations in the same industry and year). 
To the best of our knowledge, none of the earlier spillover studies has taken into account 
all of the above concerns. As for the papers on vertical spillovers, Schoors et al. (2001) employ a 
two-step selection procedure but do not include firm or industry fixed effects (since their dataset 
pertains to a two-year period only), while Blalock (2001) controls for firm fixed effects but not 
for the selection issue.  Neither study includes differencing of spillover variables, a correction for 
endogeneity of input choices or a correction of errors for the downward bias pointed out by 
Moulton (1990). 
 
Estimation Results 
 
The results from the first differences model described in the previous section are 
presented in Table 3.  The first two columns contain the coefficients estimated for the full sample 
followed by those for the subsample of domestic firms.  All of them pertain to the model without 
the Olley-Pakes correction.  As expected, positive and significant coefficients on the changes in 
all production inputs as well as on the change in the share of foreign equity are obtained.  The 
latter finding implies that an increase in foreign capital participation in a given firm is associated 
with faster output growth. As in earlier studies, the coefficient on the proxy for horizontal 
spillovers does not appear to be statistically significant.  More importantly for this study, the 
regressions produce a positive and significant coefficient on the measure of backward linkages 
both in the full sample and the subsample of domestic firms.  The magnitude of the effect is 
economically meaningful. A one-standard-deviation increase in the foreign presence in the 
sourcing sectors (i.e., an increase in the backward variable of three percentage points) is 
associated with a ten percent rise in output of each domestic firm in the supplying industry.  
When the Olley-Pakes correction is applied (see the last four columns of Table 3), the 
coefficients on the backward variable are positive but not significant at the conventional levels.  
As before, a positive correlation between the change in the foreign equity share and firm 
productivity growth is found but there is no indication of the presence of horizontal spillovers. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 548 
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The next issue to be addressed is whether potential spillovers operate at the regional or 
national level.  To examine this question the Backward measure is calculated for the region of 
the firm in question as well as separately for all other regions. Since Lithuania is a relatively 
small country, for the purpose of this exercise ten regions are considered. Analogously, one 
measure of horizontal spillovers is computed for the region where the firm in question is located 
and another measure for all other regions.   Note that the measures pertaining to own region are 
firm specific since they exclude the output of the firm in question.  Since in this model, there is 
no problem of mixing industry-specific variables with firm-specific observations, standard errors 
are corrected for heteroskedasticity but not clustered on each industry. 
The results presented in Table 4 show a positive and significant correlation between firm 
productivity and foreign presence in downstream sectors in the same region.  The coefficients are 
significant in all eight regressions, even when the Olley-Pakes correction is applied.  The 
coefficients are larger in magnitude and more significant in the case of the domestic firm 
subsample.  As for the impact of downstream multinationals in other regions, this effect is 
positive and significant only in the first four columns of the table.  The proxies for foreign 
presence in the same sector (both in the same region and other parts of the country) do not appear 
to be statistically significant.  In summary, there is strong evidence of positive correlation 
between firm output growth and the change in foreign presence in downstream sectors in the 
same region and less robust evidence with respect to foreign presence in other regions. 
 
As mentioned before, case studies and evidence based on particular sectors suggest that 
domestic-market-oriented affiliates tend to source more locally than the affiliates focused on 
exporting.  And since the extent of spillovers is likely to be correlated with the intensity of 
contacts between domestic firms and multinationals, one would expect to observe greater 
spillovers associated with domestic-market-oriented affiliates.  To examine this question, two 
separate measures of backward linkages are calculated: one for affiliates exporting more than 
half of their output and one for foreign firms selling at least half of their output locally.  The 
latter variable is defined as follows: 
Backward (Domestic-Market-Oriented)jt = Σ k if k≠j  αjk * [Σi for all i∈ k  FSikt *DMOikt* Outputikt]/  
Σ i for all i∈ k  Outputikt William Davidson Institute Working Paper 548 
  15
where DMOikt = 1 if firm i sold at least half of its output in the local market.  Otherwise, it takes 
on a value of zero.  The measure for export-oriented affiliates in calculated analogously.  Both 
measures are included in the model keeping the horizontal variable defined as before. 
The results presented in Table 5 provide some support for the hypothesis.  While in all 
eight regressions both backward measures are positive and statistically significant, their 
coefficients are larger in the case of domestic-market-oriented affiliates.  The difference in 
magnitude between the two types of backward measures is statistically significant at the one 
percent level in four cases, five percent in two cases and ten percent in the remaining two 
regressions.  Thus the results suggest that greater FDI spillovers are associated with the presence 
of multinationals producing for the domestic market rather than those using Lithuania as an 
export platform. 
 
Next consider the hypothesis that backward linkages associated with partially-owned 
foreign projects lead to greater spillovers than linkages associated with wholly-owned foreign 
affiliates.  To examine this question two measures of backward linkages are calculated: one for 
firms with the share of foreign capital equal to at least 99 percent and another one for enterprises 
with foreign participation above 10 but less than 99 percent.
24   
The results shown in Table 6, however, lend little support to the hypothesis.  While there 
is evidence of a significant positive correlation between firm’s output growth and backward 
linkages associated with jointly-owned foreign affiliates but not those associated with wholly-
owned foreign projects, the difference between the magnitudes of the two coefficients is not 
statistically significant.  Moreover, when the Olley-Pakes correction is applied, neither of the 
backward variables is statistically significant.  Thus, the extent of foreign ownership does not 
appear to have an effect on the benefits stemming from foreign presence in downstream sectors. 
 
                                                 
24 There are 262 observations pertaining to fully owned foreign affiliates and further 25 observations for firms with 
foreign capital share of more than 99 and less than 100 percent. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 548 
  16
Conclusions 
 
Many countries, including developing and transition economies, compete against one 
another in attracting foreign investors by offering ever more generous incentive packages and 
justifying their actions with the productivity gains that are expected to accrue to domestic 
producers from knowledge externalities generated by foreign affiliates. Despite this question 
being hugely important to public policy choices, there is little conclusive evidence to support this 
claim. 
This study is an effort to further the understanding of this issue.  It examines whether 
there exists a correlation between productivity growth of domestic firms and the presence of 
foreign affiliates in downstream sectors.  It improves over the existing literature by focusing on 
the understudied issue of FDI spillovers through backward linkages (i.e., contacts between 
foreign affiliates and their local suppliers) rather than the horizontal channel (i.e., benefits 
enjoyed by domestic firms from foreign presence in their sector) and going beyond the existing 
studies by shedding some light on factors driving this phenomenon.  This study also addresses 
several econometric problems that may have biased the results of the earlier research. 
The estimation results, based on a firm-level panel data set from Lithuania, are consistent 
with the presence of productivity spillovers taking place through backward linkages.  They 
suggest that a three-percentage-point increase in the foreign presence in downstream sectors is 
associated with a ten-percent rise in firm output.  Moreover, the data indicate that local firms 
benefit from the operation of foreign affiliates in downstream sectors in their own region as well 
as in other parts of the country, with the evidence of the latter effect being weaker, however.  
Further, greater productivity benefits are found to be associated with domestic-market- rather 
than export-oriented foreign companies.  No difference is detected, though, between the effects 
of fully-owned foreign firms and those with joint domestic and foreign ownership.   
As is often the case with empirical studies, the results are subjects to several caveats.  The 
definitions of industries are quite broad and thus inevitably producers of products that are 
significantly different may be lumped together. Moreover, given the data limitation, it is not 
possible to control for firm entry and exit.  Finally, it is important to emphasize that the findings 
of a positive correlation between productivity growth enjoyed by domestic firms and the increase 
in multinational presence in downstream sectors should not be interpreted as a call for William Davidson Institute Working Paper 548 
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subsidizing FDI.  These results are consistent with the existence of knowledge spillovers from 
foreign affiliates to their local suppliers but they may also be due to increased competition in 
upstream sectors. While the former case would call for offering FDI incentive packages, it would 
not be the optimal policy in the latter.  Further research is certainly needed to disentangle 
different channels through which FDI spillovers operate. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 548 
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Table 1.  Distribution of Firms with Foreign Capital by Industry in 2000 
 
NACE   
Domestically 
Owned 
Firms 
(1) 
Firms with 
Foreign 
Capital* 
(2) 
All Firms
(3)  (2)/(3)*100 Horizontal Backward
15   Manuf. of food products and beverages   437  55  492  11  26.6  1.5 
17   Manuf. of textiles   84 34  118  29  39.7  13.7 
18   Manuf. of wearing apparel; dressing, dyeing of fur   201 49  250  20  33.5  2.7 
20   Manuf. of wood & wood products except furniture   432 47  479  10  34.3  12.5 
22   Publishing, printing & reproduction of recorded media  225 12  237  5 7.0  3.5 
24   Manuf. of chemicals & chemical products   48 17  65  26  21.0  7.4 
25   Manuf. of rubber & plastic products   118 25  143  17  31.4  11.0 
26   Manuf. of other non-metallic mineral products   148 18  166  11  35.3  3.1 
28   Manuf. of fabricated metal products, exc. machinery   169 25  194  13  10.7  8.4 
29   Manuf. of machinery & equipment n.e.c   106 13  119  11  23.2  6.9 
31   Manuf. of electrical mach. & apparatus n.e.c.   43 5  48  10  65.3  7.1 
32   Manuf. of radio, tv, communication equipment   28 5  33  15  32.2  14.4 
33   Manuf. of medical, precision & optical instruments   46 9  55  16  23.8  11.9 
35   Manuf. of other transport equipment   40 8  48  17  71.5  0.2 
36   Manuf. of furniture; manufacturing n.e.c.   169 20  189  11 9.7  6.7 
 Total  2,294 342  2,636  13    
* foreign share of at least 10 percent of total capital William Davidson Institute Working Paper 548 
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Table 2.  Summary Statistics        
          
Variable  No. of obs. Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
                 
Output 11,652 5,587,446 24,300,000 11  660,000,000
No. of employees  11,652 84 238 1  6,176
Fixed Assets   11,652 2,587,088 11,000,000 10  298,000,000
Material Inputs  11,652 2,898,996 13,300,000 2  376,000,000
Gross Investment   11,652 429,823 2,681,202 0  82,300,000
Foreign capital share (%)  11,644 7.8 23.0 0  100.0
Exports/Output (%)  9,776 21.0 34.0 0  100.0
Horizontal (%)  11,644 19.7 12.3 0  79.5
Horizontal same region (%)  11,633 15.8 15.6 0  100.0
Horizontal other region (%)  11,652 19.3 13.9 0  81.0
Backward (%)  11,652 4.9 4.0 0  17.2
Backward same region (%)  11,652 2.8 2.9 0  30.0
Backward other region (%)  11,652 4.3 3.8 0  18.5
Backward (Export-oriented MNCs)  11,652 3.1 2.6 0  16.6
Backward (Local-market-oriented MNCs) 11,652 1.8 2.0 0  13.4
Backward (Full ownership)  11,652 1.9 2.0 0  14.7
Backward (Shared ownership)  11,652 3.0 2.5 0  8.9
                 
 
 William Davidson Institute Working Paper 548 
  23
 
Table 3. Regresions in First Differences         
             
                     with Olley-Pakes correction 
   All firms    Domestic firms    All firms    Domestic firms 
                              
∆ ln L  0.373*** 0.373*** 0.360*** 0.359***  
  (0.019) (0.019) (0.021) (0.021)  
∆ ln K  0.040*** 0.040*** 0.038*** 0.039***  
  (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012)  
∆ ln M  0.212*** 0.212*** 0.212*** 0.212***  
  (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019)  
∆ Foreign share  0.001** 0.001**    0.001** 0.001**
  (0.001) (0.001)    (0.001) (0.001)
∆ Backward  0.038* 0.038*   0.038* 0.038*  0.030 0.030   0.030 0.030
   (0.019) (0.019)   (0.021) (0.021)  (0.025) (0.025)   (0.027) (0.027)
∆ Horizontal  -0.001 0.000   0.000 0.000
 (0.002) (0.002)    (0.002) (0.003)
Intercept -0.056 -0.054 -0.068 -0.070    -0.057 -0.055 -0.075 -0.078
 (0.056) (0.057) (0.049) (0.050)    (0.058) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057)
    
Year dummies  yes yes  yes yes   yes yes yes yes
Industry dummies  yes yes  yes yes   yes yes yes yes
Regional dummies  yes yes  yes yes   yes yes yes yes
           
No. of obs.  6862 6862  5925 5923   6862 6862 5925 5923
F-stat 51.96 50.56  42.4 42.38    2.86 2.77 2.15 2.13
Prob > F  0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00   0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
R
2  0.38 0.38 0.37 0.37    0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Standard errors in parenthesis have been corrected for clustering for each industry in each year. ***, **, * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10% level.
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Table 4. Regresions in First Differences.  Intra- versus Inter-regional Spillovers 
            
                   with Olley-Pakes correction 
   All firms  Domestic firms    All firms    Domestic firms 
   
∆ ln L  0.372*** 0.372*** 0.359*** 0.359*** 
  (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) 
∆ ln K  0.040*** 0.040*** 0.038*** 0.039*** 
  (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) 
∆ ln M  0.213*** 0.212*** 0.212*** 0.212*** 
  (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
∆ Foreign share  0.001** 0.001**  0.001* 0.001*
  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001)
∆ Backward same region  0.016** 0.016** 0.019*** 0.019***    0.015* 0.015*   0.018** 0.017**
   (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)    (0.008) (0.008)   (0.008) (0.008)
∆ Backward other region  0.021** 0.021** 0.024** 0.023**    0.017 0.017  0.018 0.018
   (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)    (0.011) (0.011)  (0.012) (0.013)
∆ Horizontal same region  0.000 -0.001  0.000 0.000
   (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001)
∆ Horizontal other region  0.001 0.000  0.000 0.000
 (0.001) (0.001)  (0.002) (0.002)
Intercept -0.060** -0.062** -0.072** -0.074**  -0.059* -0.060* -0.078** -0.080**
 (0.030) (0.031) (0.033) (0.033)  (0.033) (0.034) (0.037) (0.038)
   
Year dummies  yes yes yes yes  yes yes yes yes
Industry dummies  yes yes yes yes  yes yes yes yes
Regional dummies  yes yes yes yes  yes yes yes yes
   
No. of obs.  6862 6853 5925 5923  6862 6853 5925 5923
F-stat 42.06 39.96 38.36 36.35  2.61 2.44 2.17 2.10
Prob > F  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
R
2 0.38 0.38 0.37 0.37  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Robust standard errors are listed in parenthesis. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level. 
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Table 5. Regresions in First Differences.  Spillovers Associated with Export- versus Domestic-market-oriented Foreign Affiliates 
                     with Olley-Pakes correction 
   All firms    Domestic firms    All firms    Domestic firms 
∆ ln L  0.373*** 0.373*** 0.360*** 0.360***  
  (0.019) (0.019) (0.021) (0.021)  
∆ ln K  0.040*** 0.040*** 0.038*** 0.039***  
  (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012)  
∆ ln M  0.213*** 0.213*** 0.213*** 0.212***  
  (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019)  
∆ Foreign share  0.001* 0.001*    0.001** 0.001*
  (0.001) (0.001)    (0.001) (0.001)
∆ Backward (export-oriented)  0.033** 0.033**  0.032** 0.032**    0.028* 0.028*  0.028* 0.028*
   (0.013) (0.013)  (0.013) (0.013)    (0.016) (0.016)  (0.016) (0.016)
∆ Backward (local-market-oriented)    0.049*** 0.050***  0.058*** 0.058***    0.050** 0.050**  0.059*** 0.059**
   (0.017) (0.017)  (0.017) (0.017)    (0.022) (0.022)  (0.023) (0.023)
∆ Horizontal   -0.001 0.000   -0.001 0.000
 (0.002) (0.002)    (0.002) (0.003)
Intercept -0.057 -0.052 -0.071 -0.071    -0.058 -0.055 -0.078 -0.080
 (0.057) (0.059) (0.051) (0.052)    (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.058)
Year dummies  yes yes yes yes   yes yes yes yes
Industry dummies  yes yes yes yes   yes yes yes yes
Regional dummies  yes yes yes yes   yes yes yes yes
No. of obs.  6862 6862  5925 5923   6862 6862 5925 5923
F-stat 56.11 54.57  43.73 43.28    3.1 3.01 2.86 2.93
Prob > F  0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00   0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
R
2 0.38 0.38  0.38 0.38    0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
BK (export) diff from BK (local-mkt-or) yes(5%) yes(10%)   yes(1%) yes(1%)    yes (5%) yes (6%)   yes (1%) yes (1%)
Standard errors in parenthesis have been corrected for clustering for each industry in each year. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level. 
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Table 6. Regresions in First Differences.  Spillovers Associated with Fully- versus Partially-Owned Foreign Affiliates 
            
                     with Olley-Pakes correction 
   All firms    Domestic firms    All firms    Domestic firms 
∆ ln L  0.373*** 0.373***  0.360*** 0.359***           
  (0.019) (0.019) (0.021) (0.021) 
∆ ln K  0.040*** 0.040*** 0.038*** 0.039*** 
  (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) 
∆ ln M  0.212*** 0.213*** 0.212*** 0.212*** 
  (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) 
∆ Foreign share  0.001** 0.001**   0.001** 0.001**  
  (0.001) (0.001)   (0.001) (0.001)
∆ Backward (fully-owned)  0.029 0.028  0.041 0.041    0.011 0.011   0.012 0.012
   (0.025) (0.025)   (0.028) (0.029)   (0.031) (0.031)   (0.035) (0.035)
∆ Backward (partially-owned)  0.040* 0.040*  0.037* 0.037*   0.034 0.034   0.033 0.033
   (0.020) (0.020)  (0.023) (0.023)   (0.025) (0.025)   (0.028) (0.028)
∆ Horizontal   -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000
 (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.003)
Intercept -0.054 -0.051 -0.069 -0.071  -0.051 -0.048 -0.070 -0.072
 (0.057) (0.058) (0.049) (0.050)  (0.060) (0.060) (0.059) (0.059)
   
Year dummies  yes yes yes yes  yes yes yes yes
Industry dummies  yes yes yes yes  yes yes yes yes
Regional dummies  yes yes yes yes  yes yes yes yes
   
No. of obs.  6862 6862  5925 5923  6862 6862 5925 5923
F-stat 53.93 52.17  40.77 40.96  3.5 3.41 2.2 2.19
Prob > F  0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
R-squared 0.38 0.38  0.37 0.37  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
            
BK (fully) diff from BK (part)  no no   no no   no no   no no
Standard errors in parenthesis have been corrected for clustering for each industry in each year.  ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level. 
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Appendix 
 
Estimation Procedure with Olley-Pakes Correction 
 
The semi-parametric estimation of the production function parameters suggested by Olley 
and Pakes (1996) is employed to account for the endogeneity of input selection by the 
firm.   
 
It is assumed that at the beginning of every period a firm chooses variable factors (labor) 
and a level of investment, which together with the current capital value determine the 
capital stock at the beginning of the next period.  The capital accumulation equation is 
given by 
 
kit+1= (1- δ)kit + iit    (1) 
 
where k=capital and  i=investment. 
 
Consider the following Cobb-Douglas production function model: 
 
yit - mit = α + βl*lit + βk*kit +ωit + ηit    (2) 
  
where  yit - mit  =log (output–materials)=log of value added, lit = log of labor, and 
subscripts i and t stand for firm and time, respectively. ωit denotes productivity, and ηit 
stands for either measurement error (which can be serially correlated) or a shock to 
productivity which is not forecastable during the period in which labor can be adjusted. 
Both ωit and ηit are unobserved.  The difference is that ωit is a state variable in the firm’s 
decision problem and thus affects the input demand while ηit does not.  Labor is assumed 
to be a freely variable input.  Capital is a fixed factor and is only affected by the 
distribution of ω  conditional on information at time t-1 and past values of ω.   
 
Since the unobserved productivity shock ωit is assumed to be correlated with kit, the 
estimated coefficient βk will be biased. The insight of the method is that the observable 
characteristics of the firm can be modeled as a monotonic function of the productivity of 
the firm. Inverting such a function allows us to model the unobserved component of the 
productivity as a function of the observed variables, namely investment.  
 
The investment decision depends on the capital stock and on firm productivity: 
 
 iit = iit (ωit, kit)   (3) 
 
By inverting the above equation, one can express unobserved productivity ωit   as a 
function of observable investment and capital and thus it is possible to control for ωit  in 
estimation. 
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  ωit = hit (iit, kit)   (4) 
 
By substituting (4) into (2), the equation to be estimated in the first stage of the procedure 
is obtained: 
 
yit - mit = α + βl*lit + βk*kit +  h(iit ,kit) + ηit    (5) 
 
The functional form of h(.) is not known. Therefore, the βk coefficient cannot be 
estimated at this stage. A partially linear model including a third order polynomial 
expansion in capital and investment to approximate the form of the h(.) is estimated.
25 
From this stage the consistent estimate of the labor input coefficient (βl) as well as the 
estimate of the third order polynomial in iit and kit (referred to as ψit) are obtained.   
 
ψit = α + βk*kit +  h(iit ,kit)   (6) 
 
Thus,                                                                                                                                                                     
h(iit ,kit)= ψit - βk*kit    (7) 
 
 
The second step of the estimation procedure considers the expectation of yit+1 - mit+1 - 
βl*lit+1  
 
E[yit+1 - mit+1 - βl*lit+1 | kit+1]   (8) 
 =  α +βk*kit+1 + E[ωit+1 |ωit ] 
≡ βk*kit+1 + g(ωit) 
 
Assuming that ωit is serially correlated, one can rewrite ωit+1 as a function of ωit, letting 
ξit+1 be the innovation in ωit+1.  Using (4) and (7), the above equation becomes a function 
of iit and kit  
yit+1 - mit+1 - βl *lit+1 = βk *kit+1 + g( ψit - βk*kit) + ξit+1 + ηit+1    (9) 
 
where g is a third order polynomial of ψit - βk*kit.  This is the equation to be estimated in 
the second stage of the procedure.  Only in this stage it is possible to obtain consistent 
estimates of βk. Since the capital in use in a given period is assumed to be known at the 
beginning of the period and ξit+1  is mean independent of all variables known at the 
beginning of the period, ξit+1 is mean independent of kit+1. A non-linear least squares 
method is used to estimate the above equation.   
 
Using the estimated coefficients, the total factor productivity is calculated as 
tfpit = yit - mit - βl *lit - βk *kit 
                                                 
25  Olley and Pakes (1996) suggest both a kernel and a series estimator, but favor the former since its 
limiting distribution is known.  
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